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Abstract 
The  objective  of  this  paper  is  to  investigate  the  impact  of  media  advertising  on  the  US 
consumption of imported wine. A panel data of seven countries and twelve years from 1994-
2005 is used to estimate the demand function for US wine imports.  Our empirical analysis 
reveals  evidence  of  strong  price  and  advertising  effects  of  domestic  and  imported  wines  on 
imported quantities; the advertising of imported wines significantly increases the quantity of 
imports while the advertising of domestic wines has a strong depressing effect on imported wine 
volumes. Our short-run import demand price and advertising elasticity estimates are -0.406 and 
0.109 for imports and 0.654 and -0.370 for domestic wines, respectively. Other determinants 
such as population, real income and country specific fixed effects are also found significant.  
Based on our model estimates, we compute the marginal return to advertising to be $2.68 on 
average for the six importing countries and $3.40 for the U.S. 
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I. Introduction 
Wine  consumption  in  the  U.S.  has  grown  dramatically  since  the  mid  1990s.  By  2005,  U.S. 
consumption  reached  nearly  nine  liters  per  capita,  up  36  percent  from  just  10  years  earlier 
(Figure 1).  Since 1995, consumption has increased at an annual growth rate of 3.1 percent.  
Imported wines are a big part of the increased consumption. The proportion of imported wines 
increased from 15.6 in 1995 to 24.5 percent in 2005. The annual growth rate of imports was 7.4 
percent, more than three times the 2.0 growth rate of domestic wines. For the last five years, the 
consumption share of imports averaged nearly 25 percent and, if trends continue, imports will 
soon be expected to exceed one quarter of U.S. wine consumption. Imported wines have made 
great  inroads  into  the  North  American  market,  both  enlarging  the  pie  and  taking  an  ever 
increasing larger slice.  
Not  only  has  the  U.S.  imported  more  wine,  but  the  geographical  origin  of  the  imports  has 
changed over time.  Import data show that New World wines are making advances in the U.S. 
market at the expense of Old World wines (Appendix Table 1). For example, since 1994 the 
combined share of U.S. imports from France, Italy, Portugal and Spain fell from 74 to 51 percent 
in 2005 while those from Australia and Chile grew from 14 to 36 percent; Australia alone saw its 
share  increase  from  5.4  to  27.7  percent.    Australia  is  rapidly  increasing  market  share,  now 
accounting for about seven percent of the total U.S. bottled wine market.  
The  reasons  for  these  consumption  changes  are  many  and  complex;  however,  in  seeking  to 
capture a larger share of the U.S. market, importing countries have made continued efforts to 
inform and differentiate their wines.  These activities typically involve country-specific generic 
and  branded  advertising  expenditures.  While  over  the  1995-2005  period,  advertising 
expenditures for domestic U.S. wines have doubled, import expenditures have increased much ￿￿
￿
more rapidly.  In Figure 2, the import share of total media advertising has averaged nearly 40 
percent since 2000. The effectiveness of advertising to influence consumer purchasing decisions 
is of great interest to both importer and domestic producers alike. This research is aimed at 
providing some insight into this issue. 
There is considerable evidence that product origin matters in consumer purchasing decisions. 
Consumer surveys reveal that, upon  entering  a  wine shop, the initial decision criteria is the 
country of origin, followed by color, variety, year etc.  For instance, Orth and Krska (2002) 
found that “buyers rank country and region at the top of wine attributes, while price, type, and 
producer name ranked lower” (p.391). In a recent consumer survey, Riberio and Santos (2007) 
found “the dominant factor of influence in the acquisition of wine is the region of origin” (p.11). 
In  recognition  of  these  and  other  studies,  advertising  and  promotion  efforts  are  a  means  of 
providing geographical product signals. Both brand and generic advertising contribute to the 
collective reputation of a country by sending a geographical origin message of product quality. 
We posit that an important economic determinant of the volume of wine imported into the U.S. is 
the degree of advertising effort.  
Consequently, our main objective in this paper is to investigate the effect of media advertising on 
the U.S. consumption of imported wine. In so doing we seek to distinguish the advertising effects 
of domestically produced wine  from that of imported wine. To our knowledge, no previous 
empirical work has sought to explore the role of both domestic and foreign advertising on wine 
imports. In our investigation, we estimate a U.S. wine import demand function of which both 
importer and domestic advertising expenditures are arguments. Procedurally, first we discuss our 
data; second, we propose an econometric model; third we present and discuss the results of our ￿￿
￿
statistical estimations; next, we conduct advertising-import sensitivity analysis, and; finally, we 
provide concluding remarks. 
 
Figure 2.  Wine Media Advertising Expenditures by Origin
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II. Empirical Framework 
As discussed above, our objective is to empirically investigate the impact of media advertising 
on the US consumption of imported wine. We use a panel dataset for the period 1994-2005 
which includes the annual volume of U.S. wine imports from the six largest wine exporting 
countries which are France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Australia, Chile, and from the rest of world. 
Due to lack of price data, we use unit values computed from the reported value and volume of 
wine  consumption.  Despite  some  concerns  with  using  unit  price  data,  they  do  reflect  actual 
transactions. The wine import data as well as U.S. GDP and population data were obtained from 
WINEFACTS.  Annual  media  advertising  expenditure  data  were  provided  by  IMPACT 
DATABANK (M.Shanken Communications, Inc.). The advertising data include both branded 
and  generic  expenditures  for  television,  radio,  outdoor,  and  internet;  no  merchandising 
expenditures are included.   
Consonant  with  several  studies,  for  instance  Gallet  (2007)  reports  72  separate  studies;  we 
estimate a parsimonious dynamic double-log import demand function to gauge the effects of 
advertising on wine imports. Consider the following dynamic linear panel data model for wine 
imports: 
(1)   log(Mit) = b0+b1*log(Mit-)+b2*log(ADMit)+b3*log(ADDit)+b4*log(PMit)+b5*log(PDit) 
+b6*log(GDPit)+ eit      
where, i indexes the country of origin of the imported wine, t indexes the year of imports, M  
measures the per capita volume of wine imports into the US, ADM represents per capita foreign 
advertising  expenditures  of  imported  wine,  ADD  is  per  capita  advertising  expenditure  of 
domestically produced wine, PM and PD are, respectively, the price of imported and locally ￿￿
￿
produced wine and, GDP is the per capita gross domestic product of the US. The US consumer 
price index is used to deflate the nominal values of the price, advertising and GDP variables.1 
Examination of alternative specifications of (1), e.g., consideration of the hypothesized substitute 
beer, and functional forms did not yield superior results.  
The error term in (1) eit is assumed to contain a time–invariant country effect as well as a random 
component that varies across time and country, i.e. eit = ui+vit. The time-invariant country effect, 
whether fixed or random, can be swept away by first-differencing the data. However, ordinary 
least squares estimation of the first-differenced model is hindered by the correlation between the 
lagged dependent variable and the error term even if vit is not auto-correlated itself (Greene, 
2000, p. 583). Arellano and Bond (1991) and Ahn and Schmidt (1995.) propose a Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) approach that  estimates the model parameters  consistently  and 
efficiently  by  using  the  values  of  the  dependent  variable,  lagged  two-periods  or  more  as 
identifying instruments in addition to the exogenous data. A drawback of the GMM estimator for 
our purposes is that its consistency depends critically on the condition that N, the number of 
cross sections, goes to ¥ and T, the number of periods, is small. Instead, we have N=7 and T = 
14.  Nonetheless,  we  attempted  to  estimate  equation  (1)  by  GMM  using  Limdep  7.0  but  the 
estimator failed to converge for our models. In this paper, we use instrumental variable approach 
to estimate (1) consistently by relying on lagged values of the exogenous variables as identifying 
instruments for the lagged dependent variable. Because our sample is small, we chose only the 
one-period lagged values of the exogenous data (PM, PD, ADD, ADM, GDP) as instruments to 
save degrees of freedom. Following standard practice, we account for fixed country- and time-
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
1 We also used a Media Index to deflate our two advertising variables; the results of our estimations are similar to 
those obtained when the consumer price index is used as a deflator. Therefore only the latter results are presented. ￿￿
￿
specific effects by including country and time dummies in our regressions.  This instrumental 
variable approach yields consistent estimates of the model parameters.2  
An additional issue arises in the estimation of our import demand equation. Given the panel 
nature of the data, the residuals may be non-spherical. Standard errors obtained from IV do not 
account  for  such  possibilities.  We  follow  Efron  (1979)  and  implemented  a  nonparametric 
bootstrap to obtain robust standard errors. Specifically, we obtain 250 bootstrap samples from 
our data; perform our instrumental variable estimation for each sample; and construct standard 
error  estimates  for  our  parameters  from  the  resulting  distribution  of  bootstrapped  parameter 
estimates.  We now turn to our statistical findings. 
III. Econometric Results 
In  Table  1  we  present  the  summary  statistics  for  the  variables  used  in  the  study  and  the 
coefficient estimates of the import demand function (1) along with their bootstrapped t-statistics. 
Caution should be taken in interpreting the descriptive statistics in that the data are in natural 
logarithms. We estimate the import demand function under two distinct premises (model I and 
model II). First, we allow the domestic and imported price elasticities to differ by including both 
prices as arguments (model I). Second, and as commonly done (see e.g, Kinnucan, 2007), we 
constrain the price elasticities to be equal in magnitude but of opposite signs by using the relative 
imported-to-domestic price (model II) as regressor; we denote the relative price variable PMD. 
For each model, an F-test fails to reject the null that time dummies are jointly different from zero 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
2 We test if the import and domestic prices are endogenous in our model using the Hausman test. Specifically we 
estimated our model first assuming that only the lagged dependent variable is endogenous using lagged values of 
advertising variables, beer price and GDP as indentifying instruments. We then re-estimated the model under the 
premise that both import and domestic prices are endogenous in addition to the lagged dependent variable. For the 
former estimation, we use lagged values of the advertising variables, beer price, GDP, and domestic and import 
prices. We could not reject the null of exogenous wine prices; therefore we estimated the model under this premise. ￿￿
￿
at any conventional level; the opposite result is found for the country dummies. Consequently, 
we estimated the models with only country fixed effects.  
Turning to the qualitative results, we note at the onset that all the key design variables were 
found to significantly impact imported wine quantities in both specifications with the exception 
of the domestic price, which is not significant in model I. The coefficient on the own-price 
variable is -0.41 and -0.42 in models I and II, respectively, indicating that imported wine is price-
inelastic. This magnitude of the own-price elasticity is in line with previously reported own-price 
elasticities of wine demand of -0.67 (Nelson, 1999), -0.55 (Pompelli and Hein), -0.28 (Gallet, 
2007)  and  -0.60  for  red  wine  imports  (Seale,  et  al.,  2003).  Notice,  Seale  et  al.  is  the  only 
previous paper to estimate own-price elasticity of import wine demand; all others reflect ordinary 
demand elasticities. For U.S. wool imports, however, Dewbre et al. found short- and long-run 
own-price elasticities of -0.234 and -0.788, respectively.  The results of our model I suggest that, 
in absolute value, imported wine is more sensitive to the price of domestically produced wine 
than it is to a change in its own-price. This cross-price elasticity of domestic wine is 0.654, 
however, it is not statistically significant. Our results also corroborate previous findings that 
imported wine is a luxury good with an income elasticity of 1.802; Nelson (1999) estimated the 
income elasticity to be 1.72 while Gallet (2007) reported an income elasticity of 1.10.  
Turning to the advertising variables, we find that media advertising undertaken by exporting 
countries has a statistically significant positive impact on the demand of imported wine. The 
elasticity  of  own-advertising  of  0.109  is  similar  in  magnitude  to  other  reported  advertising 
elasticities of domestic wine demand, such as 0.15 by Duffy (1984) and 0.07 by Nelson (1999). 
 ￿￿￿
￿
Table 1:  Estimation of the Import Demand Function for Wine into the US. 
Standard Model I Model II
Variable Mean  Deviation Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Intercept -6.756 -3.017 *** -6.058 -3.142 ***
Lagged Wine imports M_t-1  -1.983 0.977 0.500 3.857 *** 0.548 4.060 ***
PM 1.310 0.334 -0.406 -4.124 ***
Price Variables PD 2.287 0.077 0.654 1.422
PMD -0.977 0.344 -0.418 -5.334 ***
ADM 0.918 1.485 0.109 3.074 *** 0.095 3.206 ***
Advertising Variables ADD 4.190 0.272 -0.370 -3.254 *** -0.328 -3.514 ***
Income Variable GDP 3.510 0.067 1.802 2.663 *** 1.740 3.202 ***
FRANCE 0.143 0.352 0.345 2.812 *** 0.344 3.307 ***
ITALY 0.143 0.352 0.405 2.753 ** 0.362 2.934 ***
Country Fixed Effects PORTUGAL 0.143 0.352 -0.518 -3.293 *** -0.461 -3.439 ***
AUSTRALIA 0.143 0.352 0.257 3.519 *** 0.255 3.687 ***
SPAIN 0.143 0.352 -0.473 -3.099 *** -0.413 -3.198 ***
CHILE 0.143 0.352 0.005 0.053 -0.015 -0.033
R^2 0.98 0.98
No of Observations 84 84 ￿
The only estimate we found to be directly comparable to our effort is that of Dewbre et 
al. (1978) who found  short-and long-run advertising elasticities for Australian wool imported to 
the  U.S  to  be  0.105  and  0.354,  respectively.  Interestingly,  our  cross-elasticity  for  domestic 
advertising  is  negative  and  some  three  times  larger  in  absolute  value  than  that  the  own-
advertising  estimate. This finding suggests that local wine producers could curb demand for 
imported  wine--therefore  boost  their  market  share--by  increasing  the  advertising  of  their 
products. For example, from model I, we find that a 50% increase in advertising by domestic 
producers  reduces  wine  imports  by  18.5%;  conversely,  a  similar  increase  in  advertising  by 
foreign competitors boosts wine imports by only 5.4%, ceteris paribus.   ￿￿￿
￿
With the exception of Chile, all of the country fixed effects are statistically significant, providing 
evidence that imported wines are differentiated by country of origin. If the coefficient of country 
dummy variable is positive, it will positively shift the import demand function, thus implying 
stronger preferences for that country’s wine most likely due to higher wine quality. The opposite 
can be said for negative coefficient signs. The trade flow data support this relationship. For 
instance, the major suppliers in the U.S. market are France, Italy and Australia (all positive) 
whereas the minor suppliers are Portugal and Spain (all negative).  
The coefficient on lagged wine imports in Model 1 is 0.5 indicating that the long run elasticities 
of income, prices, and advertising are about twice their short-run counterparts. This result lends 
support to our partial adjustment specification. Furthermore, it accentuates the importance of 
advertising as a driving force of the demand for imported wine. In the long-run, our results 
indicate  that  a  50%  increase  in  advertising  of  domestically  produced  wine  leads  to  a  37% 
decrease in wine imports, or nearly 210 million liters per annum, based on the average volume of 
US wine imports for the period 2001-2005. 
Finally, we sought to allow price elasticities to differ by country of origin by interacting the 
import price variable with the country dummies. In doing so, we found that all of the coefficients 
on  the  interactions  terms  but  one  (France)  and  the  import  price  coefficient  are  highly 
insignificant  (p-values  ranging  between  .22  and  .91).  A  similar  attempt  to  differentiate 
advertising elasticities by country of origin also yielded insignificant coefficient estimates on all 
interaction terms and on the import advertising coefficient with p-values ranging between 0.15 
and 0.94.  
 ￿￿￿
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IV. Economic Returns to Advertising 
Table  2  reports  the  results  of  using  Model  1  to  compute  estimates  of  the  returns  due  to 
advertising  for  wine  over  the  period  2001-2005.  Accordingly,  we  computed  the  expected 
increase in the volume of U.S. imports attributable to an increase in country-of-origin advertising 
of  25,  50  and  100  percent.  The  value  of  these  increased  imports  was  computed  under  two 
alternative assumptions: no import price adjustment, and prices adjust downward according to 
our own-price flexibility of import demand (1/-0.406).   The benefit-cost ratios shown in Table 2 
reflect the marginal change in the value of imports due to increased advertising relative to the 
marginal cost of the advertising effort.  
As expected the benefit-cost ratios in Table 2 are greatest when import prices do not adjust to the 
advertising-induced import volume increase; this scenario treats prices as exogenous. We note 
that all benefit cost ratios are greater than 1.0. For example, for Australia, a 100 percent increase 
in advertising yields a $1.56 return for each dollar invested. 
We also see that as the percentage of advertising increases, diminishing returns to advertising 
occurs. Since, in addition to the advertising elasticity, the benefit cost ratio is a function both 
prices  and  advertising  expenditure  levels,  the  returns  to  advertising  can  exhibit  considerable 
variability among countries. This suggests that a country like Chile may be at a particular steep 
portion  of  the  advertising  response  function.    The  volume-weighted  (2001-2005)  average 
marginal rate of return of a 100 percent advertising increase for the six foreign countries is $2.68.    
Our returns estimates are comparable to those of other investigators. For example, Dewbre et al. 
(1987) found a marginal rate of return to wool advertising in the U.S. to be 1.94; for U.S. cotton 
exports, Kinnucan et al. (1995) found $1.13 return per dollar spent on export cotton promotion, ￿￿￿
￿
and; Williams (1985) found a rate of return of $14 per dollar spent advertising U.S. soybean 
exports. While the analytical approaches taken by these authors varied widely, they were all 
based  on  the  assumption  of  competitive  markets  with  homogenous  products.  We  differ 
fundamentally in that we explicitly recognize that foreign wines are imperfect substitutes for 
U.S. domestic wines. Accordingly, a decrease (increase) in U.S. wine imports will be to some 
extent captured by increased (decreased) domestic sales. Thus, the benefit cost ratios for the U.S. 
in Table 2 are computed under the assumption that the U.S. captures 50 percent of the drop in 
imports due to increased domestic advertising (cross-advertising elasticity -0.370). Although not 
shown here, as the degree of import-domestic wine substitutability increases (decreases) beyond 
the  50  percent  level,  the  U.S.  benefit-cost  ratios  become  smaller  (larger).  The  “with  price 
adjustment” scenario recognizes that the additional quantities captured by the U.S. will elicit a 
downward price response as reflected by our literature-supported price elasticity of domestic 
demand equal to -0.65. 
Table 2: Marginal Rates of Returns for Different Levels of Increase in Own advertising 
Expenditures 
 Increase in own-advertsizing
Country With price adjustment No price
25% 50% 100% adjustment
Australia 1.99 1.85 1.56 2.14
Chile 12.67 11.76 9.93 13.58
France 2.83 2.63 2.22 3.04
Italy 2.43 2.26 1.91 2.60
Portugal 3.46 3.21 2.71 3.70
Spain 1.17 1.08 0.92 1.25
US 6.74 5.62 3.40 7.85  
Note: These marginal rates are based on short-run elasticities in Model I (see Table 1). The coefficient on the lagged 
dependent  variable  in  Model  I  indicates  that  Long-  run  marginal  rates  of  return  are  twice  their  short-run 
counterparts. 
 ￿￿￿
￿
With price adjustment, a doubling of expenditures by the U.S. yields a marginal rate of return to 
advertising  of  $3.40.  We  further  explored  the  expected  impact  of  changes  in  domestic 
advertising  on  importers’  revenue.  The  cross-elasticity  of  advertising  (-0.37)  is  large  and 
negative. Thus, increases in domestic advertising can greatly reduce import quantities. In the 
short-run, we find that an increase in domestic advertising can actually benefit importers because 
the import price increase overcompensates for the decrease in quantity. However, we found that 
in the long-run, advertising expenditure increases greater than 25 percent tend to hurt importing 
countries (benefit cost ratios become less than 1.0). 
 
V. Concluding remarks 
There  is  ample  evidence  that  foreign  wines  are  taking  an  increasing  portion  of  the  rapidly 
growing bottled wine market. Foreign and domestic wines are imperfect substitutes. Countries 
exporting wine to the U.S. are interested in how advertising affects their products sales in the 
U.S. market. In the same way, domestic U.S. sales are impacted by both foreign and domestic 
advertising  expenditures.  We  empirically  investigate  these  and  other  interrelationships  by 
estimating a dynamic linear panel data model of wine imports into the U.S. market. We use 
annual data over the period 1994-2005 consisting of U.S. import volumes from the six highest 
volume foreign countries, advertising expenditures by each foreign country, domestic wine sales, 
domestic advertising expenditures, and other relevant import demand determinants. Results show 
that  advertising  of  imported  wines  significantly  increases  the  quantity  of  imports  while  the 
advertising of domestic wines has a strong negative effect on imported wine volumes. Our short-
run import demand price and advertising elasticity estimates are -0.406 and 0.109 for imports ￿￿￿
￿
and 0.654 and -0.37 for domestic wines, respectively.  Over the period 2001-2005, the average 
six  country  volume-weighted  marginal  return  to  advertising  is  $2.68  and  for  the  U.S.  the 
marginal return was $3.40. Our empirical findings suggest that country advertising contributes to 
product differentiation and boosts product sales in the U.S. market. Both foreign and domestic 
advertising efforts provide positive economic returns.            
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Appendix 1:  U.S. Bottled Wine Imports by Country, Total Volume (in millions of liters) 
and Market Share, 1994-2005 
￿
￿
Source: IMPACT DATABANK
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
France 60.6 69.9 80.6 94.3 90.5 84.6 93.7 90.2 94.8 79.9 76.6 77.4
Import Share (%) 27 25.5 24.7 24.9 24.7 22.8 21.9 18.9 16.8 14.6 12.8 11.9
 
Italy 88.6 118.7 127.3 151.7 144.5 156.6 174.6 194.4 212.7 178.6 188.4 207.5
Import Share (%) 39.6 43.2 39 40.1 39.4 42.3 40.7 40.7 37.8 32.7 31.5 31.8
Portugal 5.9 6.2 7.5 7.4 7.2 8.3 7.8 12.9 16.1 14.6 14.2 19.3
Import Share (%) 2.6 2.3 2.3 2 2 2.2 1.8 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.4 3
Spain 10.3 9.6 10.5 12.7 13.1 12 17.5 16.1 24.5 22.1 24.6 29
Import Share (%) 4.69 3.5 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.21 4.1 3.4 4.4 4.1 4.1 4.4
Australia 12 15.5 18.7 25.7 31.6 39 55.5 69.8 111.1 143.8 170.2 180.4
Import Share (%) 5.4 5.3 5.7 6.8 8.6 10.5 13 14.6 19.7 26.4 28.4 27.7
Chile 19.9 27.4 50.2 50.7 49.8 32.6 47.8 47.3 52.9 51.7 56.8 55.6
Import Share (%) 8.9 10 15.4 13.4 12.8 8.8 11.1 9.9 9.4 9.5 9.5 8.5
Other 26.6 28.1 31.6 35.6 32.5 37.9 31.8 46.9 50.8 54.4 67.7 82.9
Import Share (%) 11.9 10.2 9.7 9.4 8.9 10.2 7.4 9.8 9 10 11.3 12.7
Total  Import Volume 223.9 274.4 326.4 378.1 366.2 371 429 477.6 562.9 545.1 598.5 651.8
1,737.30 1,756.20 1,892.50 1,964.40 1,990.90 2,055.30 2,157.50 2,165.00 2,316.40 2,422.40 2,524.60 2,660.90
12.9 15.6 17.2 19.3 18.4 18 19.9 22 24.2 22.5 23.6 24.5
Total U.S. Consumption
Import Share of U.S. 
Consumption (%)￿￿￿
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Appendix Table 2.  Wine Media Advertising Expenditures by Origin (Millions of Dollars) 
 
Origin  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Domestic (mil $)  30.5  40.1  48.5  70.3  87.1  82.1  86.4  4.9  68.0  78.6  81.2  69.2 
Share (%)  63.0  68.0  73.5  69.8  67.2  70.1  65.1  67.6  55.8  57.5  60.4  53.1 
                         
Imported (mil $)  18.3  18.9  17.5  30.4  42.5  35.0  46.4  35.9  53.8  58.0  53.2  61.2 
Share (%)  37.0  32.0  26.5  30.2  32.8  29.9  34.9  32.4  44.2  42.5  39.6  46.9 
                         
  Total  48.8  59.0  66.0  100.7  129.7  117.0  132.8  110.8  121.8  136.6  134.4  130.4 
 
Source: IMPACT DATABANK   
 
 
Appendix Table 3.  Wine Media Advertising Expenditures by Country Origin (Millions of Dollars) 
 
Origin  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Australia  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.6  0.8  5.2  4.8  8.8  12.2  17.7  20.1 
France  3.7  4.3  5.9  8.7  10.5  15.2  16  8.7  10  17.8  12.2  15.4 
Italy  7.9  8.7  4.5  12.5  17.8  11.8  16  15.4  27.2  14.1  10  14.5 
Spain  4.7  4.2  5.2  4.9  4.2  4.5  6.0  4.6  4.0  5.8  6.2  4.3 
Portugal  0.1  0.2  0.6  1.4  0.8  0.5  1.8  1.1  1.1  0.5  0.4  0.9 
Chile  0.9  0.5  0.8  1.5  1.6  0.1  0.5  0.4  1.0  0.7  0.5  0.6 
Other  0.9  1.0  0.6  1.4  7.1  2.2  1.0  1.0  1.6  5.7  4.8  4.0 
Total  18.3  18.9  17.5  30.4  42.5  35.0  46.4  35.9  53.8  58  53.2  61.2 
 
Source: IMPACT DATABANK   
 
 
 